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EXAS jurisprudence was not changed by any partnership cases
during the Survey period. In fact, there is nothing particularly
monumental to report.' But, as usual, there are a number of cases
that contain enough nuggets to justify reporting. Because limited liability
companies are growing in importance,2 and because the relevance of
bankruptcy cases tends to cross state lines, we also considered cases in
those areas for the period, and report on one of each flavor.
II. PARTNERSHIP CASES
A. FORMATION
Fiduciary Duties-Do parties to a partnership agreement owe a fiduci-
ary duty to each other before the formation of the partnership?-Tsai
v. Joseph J. Blake & Associates, Inc.
The principal partnership issue in Tsai was whether the defendant
owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff before the formation of their part-
nership. Peter Tsai ("Tsai"), a Taiwanese real estate investor interested
in Dallas area real estate, met with Henry Billingsley ("Billingsley") to
discuss an investment in an 831 acre tract of land in Carrollton (the
"Property"). Shortly after that meeting, Billingsley sent Tsai a letter with
price information for the Property and a suggestion that they form a joint
venture to hold the Property. Billingsley enclosed with the letter a sam-
ple standard form partnership agreement.3 Some months later, Tsai en-
gaged an independent appraiser (from a list supplied by Billingsley) who
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.B.A., Baylor University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Haynes
and Boone, L.L.P., Richardson, Texas.
1. There were dozens of cases that involved partnerships as parties, but few con-
tained a key partnership issue.
2. They would be wildly more popular if they were not subject, unlike partnerships,
to the Texas franchise tax. They clearly are the tax pass-through entity of choice in states
that do not have a similar tax impediment.
3. Tsai v. Joseph J. Blake & Assocs., Inc., No. 05-00-00962-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas
Aug. 6, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1792212, at *1 (noting that
Billingsley sent this agreement to show Tsai the form of agreement that Billingsley typi-
cally used to hold property jointly with investors).
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valued the property at $118,000,000, almost the identical value quoted by
Billingsley in' the initial meeting with Tsai.4
A few months later, Billingsley sent Tsai another letter to encourage
Tsai's investment, since Tsai had independently confirmed the Property's
value. After a few more months, Tsai sent Billingsley a deposit for the
Property, and the two agreed to hold the investment in a limited partner-
ship (the "Partnership"). 5 Thereafter, Billingsley periodically updated
Tsai on the value of the Property, consistently reporting appreciation. In
1995, Tsai elected to sell his interest in the Property and obtained new
appraisals showing that the value of the Property was dramatically lower
than the $118 million quoted by Billingsley in their initial meetings (and
confirmed by the original appraisal Tsai obtained).6 Tsai sued Billingsley
alleging, among several other theories, that Billingsley had breached a
fiduciary duty to Tsai by misrepresenting the Property's value. 7
The trial court granted summary judgment for Billingsley on Tsai's
breach of fiduciary duty claim on the ground that Billingsley did not owe
Tsai a fiduciary duty before the Partnership was formed.8 Tsai appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that Billingsley did not owe him
a fiduciary duty before the Partnership was formed.9 Tsai also claimed
that Billingsley's fiduciary duty breach constituted constructive fraud.' 0
Tsai's key theory was that a fiduciary duty arose two years before the
formation of the Partnership when Billingsley sent him the letter sug-
gesting formation of a joint venture to hold the Property and enclosed a
form of partnership agreement. 1' Tsai supported the theory with the ar-
4. Id. (stating that while Billingsley had purchased the property in 1984 for $0.89 per
square foot, he had told Tsai that the value of the property had increased to approximately
$3.25 per square foot, or $117,873,360). Tsai's independent appraisal confirmed that the
value was $118,000,000 as of June 15, 1988. Id.
5. Id. at *1-2. Tsai paid the initial deposit of $250,000 on November 30, 1988, imme-
diately before formation of the entities that would hold the Property. The transaction
ultimately closed on March 15, 1989. Id. at *2.
6. Id. (stating that the appraiser valued the Property at $7,900,000, as of September 1,
1995, and additional appraisals showed the value of the Property on June 15, 1988, as being
$22,500,000, and $4,600,000, compared to both Billingsley's initial quote of $117,873,360
and Tsai's independent appraisal).
7. Id. (stating that Tsai's claims against Billingsley and his related entities included
that they were "negligent, grossly negligent, made negligent misrepresentations, breached
their fiduciary duties to [Tsai], committed common-law and statutory fraud, fraudulent
concealment, and constructive fraud").
8. Id. (noting that the trial court also granted summary judgment for Billingsley on
the claims of fraud and misrepresentation, ruling that "causes of action for fraud and mis-
representation 'arising out of statements regarding the value of real estate . . . are not
actionable as a matter of law."'); id. (stating that "the remaining causes of action were
tried before a jury that found against [Tsai] on every issue.").
9. Id. at *3.
10. Id. The court stated that "[c]onstructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equi-
table duty which, regardless of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its ten-
dency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure the public interest." Id. at *5
(citing Gillum v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S.W.2d 558, 571 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no
writ)).
11. Id. Remember, this was simply a form that Billingsley used in similar situations
and was not a document drafted for this particular deal.
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gument that, in promoting the benefits of the investment and ultimate
sale, Billingsley had engendered a confidential relationship. 12
The court of appeals ruled that neither Billingsley's letter and sample
partnership agreement, nor his "extolling the benefits of a confidential
relationship," 13 elevated the parties' pre-formation relationship to a level
that imposed a fiduciary duty on Billingsley. 14
.In dicta, the court agreed with Tsai that parties who deal together "as
joint venturers" owe a confidential relationship to each other; but such a
joint venture relationship must first be found.' 5 To determine whether the
parties had formed a "joint venture" before their formal entry into the
Partnership, the court examined the necessary elements of a joint ven-
ture: "(1) a community of interest; (2) an agreement to share profits; (3)
an agreement to share losses; and (4) a mutual right of control or man-
agement of the enterprise. ' 16 The court determined that none of the par-
ties' actions before the Partnership was formed-including Billingsley's
suggestion that the parties form a joint venture, Tsai's placing a deposit
on the property for the right to purchase a share of the investment, and
the inclusion of the partnership agreement with Billingsley's letter to
Tsai1 7- resulted in the creation of a joint venture. The court also stated
that Billingsley and Tsai "never agreed they would have a mutual right of
control or management of the enterprise or that they would share in the
losses of the enterprise, two necessary elements of a joint venture ...""I
Based on these findings, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of Billingsley.
Although somewhat inconsistent with the marketing efforts that go
into finding an outside investor, it can be useful to a person in Billings-
ley's position to expressly deny (in writing) the existence of a confidential
relationship, joint venture or partnership until definitive documents are
executed.
B. BRINGING SUIT
Standing-Does an out-of-state partnership have standing to sue in
Texas without first obtaining a certificate of authority?-Goss v. Bobby
D. Associates
12. Id. at *6.
13. Id. It was difficult to find such an "extolling," as such, in the facts recounted in the
opinion apart from Billingley's promotion of his experience in joint real estate investments
in the Dallas market, especially with foreign partners, his family's standing in the commu-
nity, and the derivative benefits to Tsai that would flow from that reputation.
14. Id. at *5-6 (stating that the court "refuse[d] to hold that a salesman's extolling the
benefits of a confidential relationship creates such a relationship").
15. Id. at *6-7.
16. Id. at *7 (citing Swineheart v. Stubbeman, McRea, Sealy, Laughlin & Browder,
Inc., 48 S.W.3d 865, 879 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
17. Id.
18. Id. The court stated that even if a fiduciary duty between the parties existed, Tsai
produced no evidence of any action that would amount to breach of a fiduciary duty or
constructive fraud on the part of Billingsley. Id.
2003] 1867
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Goss concerned whether an out-of-state partnership had standing to
sue on a contract in Texas without first obtaining a certificate of author-
ity. Wild Willie II Corporation entered into separate contracts to sell va-
rious parcels of land to Jackson 0. Goss and others (collectively, "Goss").
Bobby D. Associates ("BDA") succeeded to Wild Willie's rights under
the contracts. Thereafter, Goss defaulted on the contracts by failing to
make the required payments to BDA. The trial court granted BDA's mo-
tion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, and Goss ap-
pealed, claiming that BDA did not have standing to sue in Texas.' 9
The essence of Goss's claim that BDA lacked standing was that BDA
was a foreign corporation with no certificate of authority to do business
in Texas.20 Goss also produced a certificate from the Secretary of State of
Ohio, BDA's principal place of business, stating that BDA was not regis-
tered to do business in its home state in any capacity. 21 But BDA had a
good response-it was a general partnership, and the requirement that a
foreign corporation obtain a certificate of authority before transacting
business did not apply to general partnerships, but only to corporations. 22
The court agreed with BDA's reasoning and added that, under Article
8.01(B) of the Texas Business Corporation Act, a foreign corporation
without a certificate of authority to do business in Texas nevertheless has
standing to bring suit to secure or collect debts. 23 Thus, even if BDA had
been a foreign corporation, it would have had standing to sue Goss to
secure payment of the debt.24
Statute of Limitations-When does the statutory period for bringing
suit under a partnership agreement begin to run?-Martin-Del Campo
v. Vega
Vega turned on when the statute of limitations, which was the basis for
the defendants' motion for summary judgment and affirmative defense,
began to run between partners. Luis Martin-Del Campo entered into a
written partnership agreement with Francisco Vega, president of Danish
Creamery, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring twenty-two acres of land and
"urbanizing [the land] in the best way possible in accordance with the
market for its sale."' 25 Martin-Del Campo made the initial contributions
19. Goss v. Bobby D. Assocs., 94 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, no pet.).
20. Id. at 69.
21. Id. at 69-70.
22. Id. at 70. The court might also have noted that out-of-state limited partnerships
and limited liability companies are subject to registration requirements in Texas. TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10.01 (Vernon 2002); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, § 7.01 (Vernon 2002). There is no such requirement for general partnerships, which
historically tended to involve more informal relationships and for which there is no central-
ized filing requirement.
23. Goss, 94 S.W.3d at 70.
24. Id.
25. Martin-Del Campo v. Vega, No. 13-00-00467 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 17,
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 551, at *1.
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and monthly installments as required by the partnership agreement.2 6
Vega later proposed that the partnership pay down a portion of the loan
on the real estate. Martin-Del Campo agreed and paid his proportionate
share, but he made no further payments to the partnership.2 7
For a reason not stated in the opinion, the defendants' suit to recover
back payments from Martin-Del Campo was dismissed.28 Martin-Del
Campo then filed a petition in the trial court to dissolve the partnership
and obtain an accounting, but the case was dismissed when the trial court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that
the claim was barred by limitations. 29 Martin-Del Campo appealed. The
defendants argued that the statutory period began to run when dealings
between the parties ceased, which they claimed was "either: (1) when
Martin-Del Campo made his final contribution to the partnership for pur-
poses of debt reduction, or (2) when Vega sent Martin-Del Campo the
Final Demand for payment. '30
The appellate court noted that the four-year statute of limitations be-
gins to run when a cause of action accrues and that "the cause of action
accrues on the day that the dealings in which the parties were interested
together cease. '31 As noted, the partnership was formed to urbanize the
land and sell it.32 The court found no evidence that this specific under-
taking had ceased, even though Martin-Del Campo failed to make the
payments required of him by the partnership agreement. 33 The court
stated that "breach of the partnership agreement... does not denote ces-
sation of dealings between the parties. ' 34 Accordingly, the court found
that the statute of limitations had not run, and it overturned the trial
court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on
the merits.
26. Id. at *1-2
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *3 n.1 (stating that the record failed to show why the defendants' suit to
recover the back payments had been dismissed).
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id. at *6.
31. Id. at *8 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §16.004(c) (Vernon Supp.
2001)).
32. Id. at *1.
33. Id. at *8-9. In other contexts, including whether a partner may dissolve a partner-
ship without breaching the partnership agreement, the completion or not of a "particular
undertaking" can be the key issue. For example, Texas Revised Partnership Act Sec. 6.02
provides that a partner's withdrawal from a partnership is wrongful if it is accomplished by
the express will of the partner before completion of the "particular undertaking" for which
the partnership was formed. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6.02(b)(2)(A)
(Vernon 2001).
34. Vega, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 551, at *9 (citing Heathington v. Heathington Lum-
ber Co., Inc., 398 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ) for the proposition
that "where there is evidence of the existence of a partnership, such status or condition is
presumed to continue until the contrary appears").
2003] 1869
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C. ALTER EGO LIABILITY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
Piercing the Limited Partnership Veil-Does the alter ego theory of li-
ability apply to limited partnerships?-Pinebrook Props., Ltd v.
Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n
In Pinebrook Properties, Ltd., the court had to determine whether
Pinebrook Properties, Ltd. (the "Limited Partnership") and its general
partner, Pinebrook Properties Management, L.L.C. (the "Limited Liabil-
ity Company"), were, in fact, alter egos of A.C. Musgrave, Jr. ("Mus-
grave"). 35 The Limited Partnership owned the property that was the
subject of the litigation, as the successor in interest to Musgrave. Mus-
grave was the president and manager of the Limited Liability Company
general partner. 36 The trial court found Musgrave liable and Musgrave
appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's application of alter ego
liability to Musgrave, finding the doctrine inapplicable to partnerships.
37
Partners in a general partnership have joint and several liability for the
obligations of the partnership. Under the Texas Revised Limited Part-
nership Act, the general partners in a limited partnership have the same
joint and several liability for partnership obligations as do partners in a
general partnership. 38 Unless they accept liability by contract, limited
partners are liable only to persons outside the limited partnership if they
participate in control of the business, and then only to third parties who
transact business with the limited partners reasonably believing that they
are dealing with a general partner.39
So where does an alter ego theory fit into all of this? Courts have al-
lowed third parties to pierce the corporate veil when the line between
corporation and individual becomes so blurred that failure to hold the
individual accountable for actions of the corporation would result in in-
justice.40 But in this situation involving a partnership, the court con-
cluded that alter ego liability is unnecessary to avoid injustice "because
the general partner is always liable for the debts and obligations of the
partnership to third parties."' 41 That covers the general partner itself, but
what about its owners (if the general partner is not an individual)? That
is where the court next turned its attention. The court considered the lia-
bility of Musgrave, as president and manager of the general partner Lim-
ited Liability Company, by looking at the total dealings of Musgrave and
the Limited Liability Company under a traditional alter ego analysis. Ex-
35. Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487,
491 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
36. Id. at 499. This is a very common structure-a limited liability company as sole
general partner of a limited partnership.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art 6132a-1, § 4.03(b) (Vernon 2001).
39. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 § 3.03(a) (Vernon 2001).
40. Pinebrook Props., Ltd., 77 S.W.3d at 499 (quoting First Nat'l v. Gamble, 132
S.W.2d 100, 103 (1939)).
41. Id. at 500.
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amining the dealings between Musgrave and the Limited Liability Com-
pany, the court found no evidence to suggest that separateness between
Musgrave and the Limited Liability Company had ceased to exist. Based
on the lack of evidence, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment that the Limited Liability Company was an alter ego of Mus-
grave and rendered a take-nothing judgment for Musgrave. 42
D. DISSOLUTION
Dissolution-When does a partnership debt become an individual debt
of a general partner?-Boulle v. Nacol, Wortham and Assocs., P.C.
This case involved an issue that the authors had not considered
before-the effect of the assignment to one party of a debt for which that
party and another have joint and several liability. In Boulle, Franco and
Jean were partners in the Boulle Group, a general partnership (the "Part-
nership"). Jean and Franco hired Nacol, Wortham and Assocs., P.C.
("Nacol") to defend them and pursue their counterclaims in a lawsuit
filed by Sunshine Mining Group.43 Franco and Jean dissolved the Part-
nership in February 1991, and then amended their agreement with Nacol
to provide that 1/3 of the proceeds from a judgment in their favor would
be paid to Nacol as payment for Nacol's services. 44 Franco and Jean en-
tered into the amendment individually and (purportedly) on behalf of the
Partnership.45 The lawsuit was settled favorably to Franco and Jean;
however, Franco challenged the amount of fees owed to Nacol and de-
manded that the disputed portion be held in escrow pending resolution. 46
Franco and Jean agreed that they would split the remainder of the settle-
ment proceeds and that Franco would assume liability for the escrowed
disputed portion of Nacol's fees. Nacol obtained a default judgment
against Franco and the Partnership, jointly and severally, for the disputed
fees. 47 Nacol assigned the judgment to Jean. The trial court granted
Jean's Motion for Turnover of Assets, and Franco appealed.48
On appeal, Franco claimed that the trial court's grant of Jean's turno-
ver motion was erroneous on two separate grounds. First, Franco
42. Id. at 500-01 (stating that there was "no evidence provided that Musgrave commin-
gled funds or that his assets and those of Pinebrook Management [L.L.C.] were not kept
separate," and that "failure to comply with corporate formalities is no longer considered in
determining alter ego and is therefore no evidence of alter ego."). Limited liability compa-
nies often are considered hybrids between corporations and limited partnerships, with fea-
tures of each. It remains to be seen whether corporate-type "piercing the veil" analyses
will be the norm for L.L.Cs, but this court, at least by implication, seemed to assume that it
could.
43. Boulle v. Nacol, Wortham and Assocs., P.C., No. 05-01-00744-CV (Tex. App.-
Dallas Feb. 7, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 188476, at *1.
44. Id.







claimed that because Jean and Franco were partners in a general partner-
ship and were jointly and severally liable on the judgment in favor of
Nacol, Nacol's assignment of the judgment to Jean extinguished the judg-
ment as to Franco.49 The court agreed with ihe principle and held that
where two partners are jointly and severally liable on a debt, the assign-
ment of the debt to one of the partners extinguishes the debt as to the
other partner.50
But was the requisite joint and several liability present here? The court
stated that, to be liable for the debt, Jean must have been an original
party to the suit or the judgment must have been a partnership debt for
which the partners had joint and several liability. Jean was not a party to
the suit. For Nacol's judgment against Franco to be a partnership debt,
Nacol had to have believed that the Partnership was still in existence
"prior to either the filing of [the] suit or the entry of the judgment and
[agreement] to release Jean from the debt." 51 The court found that "evi-
dence at the turnover hearing established that Franco's debt on the judg-
ment was incurred after the dissolution" of the Partnership and that
Nacol had notice of the dissolution at the time the debt was incurred. 52
The parties' course of conduct indicated that the judgment against Franco
was not a partnership debt and that Jean was not jointly and severally
liable for the judgment against Franco.53
Franco also contended that, even if the judgment was not extinguished
by the assignment to Jean, Jean was jointly and severally liable for the
debt as a general partner.54 The court summarily disposed of that issue,
having already determined that the debt was not a debt of the Partner-
ship. Therefore, the court concluded that Franco alone was liable, and
had no right of contribution or indemnity from Jean.55
Dissolution-Is there a distinction between "dissolution" and "grounds
for dissolution"?-In re Woskob
The answer to the question posed in the caption, as with "void" and
"voidable," is "yes." The two are not the same. In In re Woskob, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that acts of wrongful exclusion serve
only as grounds for dissolution in certain instances and do not automati-
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id. (citing BW Viii., Ltd. v. Tricon Enters., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) and Rich v. Smith, 481 S.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Because this principle applies to those with
joint and several liability, it is ripe for application to general partners.
51. Id. at *2-3.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *1.
55. Id. at *4. And didn't that result leave the parties where they agreed to be, with
Franco responsible for the disputed fees to Nacol?
[Vol. 561872
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cally dissolve the partnership by operation of law.56 The court also ruled
that the bankruptcy of a partner operates to dissolve a partnership only
when the non-debtor partner refuses to continue in the partnership with
the debtor-in-possession. 57
The Third Circuit considered the bankruptcy court's ruling that, after
her husband died, Ms. Woskob had exercised her option to purchase his
interest in the Legends Partnership (the "Partnership") within the time
provided by the partnership agreement.58 On appeal from the bank-
ruptcy court, the district court ruled that, before Mr. Woskob's death,
certain other acts by the partners had dissolved the partnership by opera-
tion of law and that, consequently, the option period expired before Ms.
Woskob's attempt to purchase Mr. Woskob's shares.59 Establishing the
ultimate act of dissolution and the date on which it took place remained
critical to the determination of whether Ms. Woskob had timely exercised
her purchase option.
Applying Pennsylvania law,60 the Third Circuit considered three things:
(1) whether acts of wrongful exclusion from the partnership were suffi-
cient to cause the dissolution of the partnership, (2) whether one part-
ner's filing of bankruptcy was sufficient to cause the dissolution of the
partnership, and (3) whether the death of Mr. Woskob dissolved the part-
nership.61 The valid exercise of Ms. Woskob's purchase option depended
on a finding that Mr. Woskob's death, and not one of the earlier acts, was
the event that dissolved the partnership.
1. Exclusion
The estate of Mr. Woskob (the "Estate") argued that either of two sep-
arate acts of wrongful exclusion from the partnership was sufficient to
cause automatic dissolution. During their divorce proceedings, Mr. Wos-
kob excluded Ms. Woskob from sharing in partnership proceeds. Not to
be outdone, Ms. Woskob obtained a divorce decree awarding her the "ex-
clusive right to manage and derive income" from the partnership, and she
used that right to terminate Mr. Woskob's management role in the part-
nership.62 The district court ruled that acts of wrongful exclusion were
56. In re Woskob, 305 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Because bank-
ruptcy principles often extend beyond state boundaries, we have included this Third Cir-
cuit case.
57. Id. at 186.
58. Id. at 181. The partnership agreement provided that either partner could exercise
the purchase option within 30 days from an act of dissolution or within 90 days from the
death of a partner. Id. at 181. Ms. Woskob exercised her option to purchase within the
two weeks after Mr. Woskob's death. Id. at 180.
59. Id. at 181.
60. Id. (stating that because the partnership was formed and managed in the State of
Pennsylvania, and because Pennsylvania was the principal place of business for the part-
nership, the court would apply the Uniform Partnership Act as adopted by the State of
Pennsylvania).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 179-80 (explaining that the partnership had employed A.W. & Sons, a busi-
ness owned by Mr. Woskob's family, to manage the partnership, and, following Ms. Wos-
2003] 1873
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sufficient to "dissolve a partnership automatically through operation of
law."' 63 Applied here, the district court found that, in each instance, one
partner had wrongfully excluded the other from participation in the busi-
ness of the partnership. 64
On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that, while the Pennsylvania Uni-
form Partnership Act ("PUPA") provided for immediate and automatic
dissolution of a partnership on expulsion of a partner, not all expulsions
were of this variety. Automatic dissolution occurs only when a partner is
expelled from the business of the partnership "in accordance with such a
power conferred by the partnership agreement. '65 The court noted the
distinction between acts of exclusion that supply grounds on which a
court can base a judicial decree of dissolution and other acts of exclusion
that cause immediate dissolution. 66 The acts of both partners were
grounds for dissolution under 15 Pa.C.S. § 8354(a), which states in part
that a court shall issue a decree dissolving a partnership where willful
breach of the partnership by one of the partners creates a situation where
it is no longer "reasonably practicable to carry on the business of partner-
ship with him."' 67 But here, the court found that because these acts were
not committed "in accordance with [an expulsion] power conferred by
the agreement between the partners," the partnership was not dissolved
by operation of law under the PUPA § 8353(1)(iv). 68 Therefore, because
the acts of exclusion were only grounds for dissolution and did not cause
an automatic dissolution of the partnership, the court did not have to
address whether the acts of exclusion were wrongful.69
2. Bankruptcy
The Estate took one more shot, arguing that the bankruptcy of Mr.
Woskob caused the automatic dissolution of the partnership (starting the
running of the time in which Ms. Woskob could exercise the purchase
option). Section 8353 of the PUPA specifically provides for the immedi-
ate dissolution of a partnership on the bankruptcy of a general partner;
however, the court found that 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B) trumps that sec-
kob's receipt of the exclusive right to manage the Partnership, Ms. Woskob terminated the
management agreement with A.W. & Sons).
63. Id. at 182.
64. Id. at 182 (stating that the district court relied upon In re Crutcher, 209 B.R. 347
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997), interpreting Pennsylvania Uniform Partnership Act ("PUPA"),
specifically 15 Pa. C.S. § 8353(1)(iv), as providing for the immediate dissolution of a part-
nership upon the expulsion of any partner). It seems odd that a court-sanctioned divorce
decree could result in Ms. Woskob's wrongful exclusion of her husband-either she had
the exclusive right to manage, or she did not.
65. Id. at 183 (quoting 15 Pa.C.S. § 8353(1)(iv)).
66. Id. at 182-83 (examining 15 Pa.C.S. 8353(1)(iv) which sets out the circumstances
where a court must enter a judicial decree dissolving a partnership). Again, like "voida-
ble" and "void." It is quite a different thing to declare a dissolution and to convince a
court that sufficient grounds exist to do so.





tion of the PUPA to the extent that non-debtor partners consent to re-
main partners with a debtor partner after the debtor partner files for
bankruptcy. 70 This provision of the bankruptcy code is subject to the lim-
itations contained in 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(2)(A) and 365(c)(1), which state
that the anti-ipso facto provisions of § 365(e)(1)(B) do not apply when
the non-debtor partners refuse to continue the partnership with the
debtor.71 The court found that Mr. Woskob, debtor-in-possession, re-
mained a partner despite having filed for bankruptcy. Evidence indicat-
70. See id. at 184-85 (stating that "§365(e)(1) invalidates ipso facto provisions, which
.. . are provisions of law or contract which specify that 'a bankruptcy filing per se will
terminate or modify' an executory contract" such as a partnership agreement).
71. Id. at 186-87 (citing 11 U.S.C. 365(e)(2)(A), which states that 365(e)(1) "does not
apply to an executory contract.., of the debtor, whether or not such contract... prohibits
or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if . . . (ii) such party does not
consent to such assumption or assignment .. "; and citing 11 U.S.C. 365(c)(1), which states
that "the trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract... of the debtor,
whether or not such contract.., prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties if ... (B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.").
The following is an excerpt from an unpublished paper co-authored by the author of this
article.
Dissolution under State Law
Both general and limited partnership statutes impose consequences on the
bankruptcy of a partner or the partnership. Recent Texas-based case law,
not universally followed, has intervened to contradict that result, or at least
to explain that the term "bankruptcy" as used in the Texas Uniform Partner-
ship Act ("TUPA") does not necessarily include (in the absence of more ex-
plicit coverage in the partnership agreement) reorganization under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Hawkins, 113 B.R. 315 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1990), following the seminal case of In re Safren, 65 B.R. 566 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1986). In Hawkins, the subject partnership agreement, following
the partnership statute, said simply that the partnership dissolved on the
"bankruptcy" of a partner, without either defining the term or distinguishing
between a partner's being in a Chapter 11 reorganization or a Chapter 7
liquidation. (For a case that expressly rejects Safren, concluding that the
term "bankruptcy" in a state's partnership statute included both Chapter 7
and Chapter 11, but nevertheless finding under its facts that a partner's bank-
ruptcy filing did not cause a dissolution, see In re Siegal, 190 B.R. 639 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1996)). The cases finding that a Chapter 11 filing was not a "bank-
ruptcy" for purposes of the TUPA (or its equivalent) found support on two
primary grounds: (i) reorganizations were not part of the bankruptcy law in
1914 when the Uniform Partnership Act was passed (Siegal specifically re-jected that argument based on Arizona's statutes being adopted after the
Chapter 11 reorganization concept was born) and (ii) dissolution automati-
cally flowing from the filing, with the possible consequences of winding up
and termination, were inconsistent with federal bankruptcy policy favoring
an opportunity to reorganize. Nevertheless, a clear statement of the parties'
intent in the partnership agreement may influence the outcome in certain
instances. (Note: Consider the effect of In re Phillips, discussed supra, in
which the Fifth Circuit held that a general partner who had made a Chap-
ter 11 filing was "bankrupt" for purposes of state law, disabling him from
filing a voluntary petition on behalf of the limited partnership. However,
there had been an earlier state court ruling ordering dissolution, which con-
tributed to the court's finding.) The Texas Revised Partnership Act
("TRPA") approach, described below in subparagraph a.(1), so long as not
varied by the partnership agreement itself, is more consistent with the Bank-
ruptcy Code prohibition against ipso facto clauses that produce a termination
simply as a result of the bankruptcy filing, not unlike the TUPA automatic
partnership dissolution on bankruptcy of a partner.
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ing Ms. Woskob's consent to Mr. Woskob's remaining a partner included
a. General Partnership.
(1) TUPA TUPA § 31(5) stipulates that dissolution is caused by the
bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership. The partnership agreement
should determine whether this would produce a winding up (liquidation) and
termination pursuant to TUPA § 38(l) (which, as noted above, may not be
enforceable under federal bankruptcy law) or a continuation of the business
by the other partners, also pursuant to TUPA § 38(1) [the authority to con-
tinue is rather oblique - the clause "unless otherwise agreed,..."].
(2) TRA. Consistent with the TRPA bias favoring continuation, the
bankruptcy of a partner is "an event of withdrawal" of that partner, but is not
an event requiring a winding up under TRPA § 8.01. Although the subject
should be dealt with in the partnership agreement (although federal bank-
ruptcy law might preempt the effort in any event), the consequences of not
doing so are different from those under the TUPA (i.e. dissolution leading to
winding up as opposed dealing with the individual partner, but continuing
the partnership).
(3) Federal Bankruptcy Law. The foregoing is under state law. But,
because the federal bankruptcy law comes into play, and generally preempts
state law (except where bankruptcy law expressly looks to state law), the
provision attached as Appendix "B" may help the continuing partners' at-
tempt to influence the outcome in the bankruptcy proceeding.
b. Limited Partnership.
The TRLPA at least contemplates that the parties may wish to vary the
results of the statute in their agreement. TRLPA § 4.02(a)(4)(B) and (C)
state that, unless otherwise provided in a written partnership agreement, or
with the consent of all partners, a person ceases to be a general partner of a
limited partnership if the person files a voluntary bankruptcy petition or be-
comes the subject of an order for relief or is declared insolvent in any federal
or state bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. If the partnership agreement
does not provide for a contrary result (under the authority of TRLPA
§ 4.02(a)(4)), and subject to case law such as In re Hawkins, discussed above
(if it survived In re Phillips, or can be distinguished), and to bankruptcy law
ipso facto prohibitions, then the bankruptcy event causes dissolution under
TRLPA § 8.01(3), unless, under the authority of Section 8.01(3)(B), all re-
maining partners (or a lesser number spelled out in the partnership agree-
ment) agrees in writing to continue, with as appropriate the appointment of
one or more new general partners. [Note: Section 8.03, which allowed recon-
stitution in the event of a dissolution of the type just discussed, has been
repealed, in favor of the 8.01(3) language that allows avoidance of dissolution
and its consequences by the will of the partners (either all of them, or as
provided in their agreement).] Thus, the event leads either to an agreed con-
tinuation, or absent that to winding up pursuant to Section 8.04, the result
depending on the pre-event partnership agreement or the agreement of the
partners after the event. Putting any common law consequences aside, it is
important to know the statutory consequences of a general partner's bank-
ruptcy and to provide in the partnership agreement for avoidance of undesir-
able results. Again, federal bankruptcy law will have something to say about
the enforceability of the agreement if it purports to reduce the interest or
rights of the debtor.
Executory Contract Issue
a. Definition. Bk. Code § 365 - subject to court approval, the trustee
may assume or reject any executory contract of the debtor. The Bk. Code
does not define "executory contract." The most widely accepted definition
(a version of the so-called "countryman" definition, named for its author, the
late Prof. Vern Countryman) is "a contract under which the obligations of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed
that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a mate-
rial breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern A. Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
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See Phoenix Exploration, Inc. v. Yaquinto (In re Murexco Petroleum, Inc.), 15
F.3d 60, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Countryman definition with approval).
b. Reec.ion
(1) Standard. No standard for determining rejection is provided by the
Bk. Code. Under the Bankr. Act, the standard developed for abandonments
of property was whether the contract would be burdensome to the estate if
not rejected. A less strict test, the "business judgment test", which requires
only a showing that rejection would improve debtor's overall financial condi-
tion, applies in "ordinary" executory contract cases not involving collective
bargaining agreements (for them, the burdensome test applies). See, e.g., In
re Food City, 94 B.R. 91 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
(2) Damages For Breach. Under §§ 365(g)(1) and 502(g) of the
Bk. Code, rejection constitutes breach of the contract as of the date before
the date the petition was filed - therefore, the claim generally is a prepeti-
tion, unsecured claim. Damages are uncertain because the claim is
unliquidated.
c. Partnership Agreement Application. Almost 20 years ago, the issue of
whether a partnership agreement was an executory contract began to emerge
in case law. There now is considerable case law support for treating partner-
ship agreements as executory contracts. This is discussed in more detail in
the following subsections.
(1) Limited Partnership Agreement. In a seminal 1981 case, the court
in In re Harms, 10 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) rejected the Countryman
definition of an executory contract (the failure of a limited partner to per-
form would not excuse the general partner's performance), but found limited
partnership agreements to be executory contracts because of substantial fu-
ture contributions required of limited partners and the many continuing obli-
gations of the sole general partner - neither party had fully performed.
Subsequent cases, applying either the Countryman test or the "functional ap-
proach" have held limited partnership agreements to be executory contracts
provided that the partners have unfulfilled material obligations. See, e.g.
Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Strouss Bldg. Assocs., 204 B.R. 948, 954 n.5 (N.D. Ohio
1997) (collecting cases holding limited partnership agreements to be execu-
tory contracts). (Note: If the facts are that the limited partners have no fur-
ther obligations, or no material ones, then the agreement may be found, in
that situation, not to be an executory contract. See the discussion in subpara-
graph (3), below, of In re Smith.)
(2) General Partnership or Joint Venture Agreement. The typical con-
tinuing and reciprocal duties and obligations among joint venturers or gen-
eral partners presumably would result in a joint venture or general
partnership agreement usually being considered an executory contract.
Seneker & Lewis, Selected Bankruptcy Aspects of Real Estate Partnerships
and Hybrid Debt-Equity Arrangements, in Real Estate Bankruptcies and
Workouts 177 (ABA Section of Real Prop. Probate and Trust Law 1983). See
also, Siegal, 190 B.R. at 643.
(3) But They Aren't Always Executory Contracts. Not all partnership
agreements have been found to be executory contracts, nor should they be.
The issue is whether there are material obligations left to be performed on
both sides. In many limited partnership contexts, performance by the limited
partners may be complete at the time of a bankruptcy filing. For example, in
the case of In re Smith 185 B.R. 285 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 1995), the court de-
clined to find that the partnership agreement was an executory contract be-
cause the debtor was merely a passive contributor of capital and had no
material obligations left to perform. It found that the provisions in the
agreement relating to annual meetings, access to information, and having the
right to seek a judicial dissolution were limited partner rights rather than
obligations. The issue was important in this case because of the claim that
the trustee relinquished rights under the partnership agreement to pursue
judicial dissolution by failing to assume the contract in a timely manner and
that, therefore, it was rejected by operation of law. It was important, there-
fore, that the particular agreement not be an executory contract.
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her continuing to list him has a general partner on the tax returns for the
years following the petition for bankruptcy. 72
3. Conclusion
The court of appeals ruled that no event that occurred before the death
of Mr. Woskob caused automatic dissolution of the partnership, vacated
the ruling of the district court and remanded the case to the district court
for a decision about whether Ms. Woskob validly exercised the purchase
option.73
E. JOINT ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Elements of Joint Enterprise Liability-What constitutes the "commu-
nity of pecuniary interest" necessary to impose joint enterprise liabil-
ity?-Blackburn v. Columbia Medical Ctr. Of Arlington Subsidiary,
LP.
As this case demonstrates, it is not always enough to show that no part-
nership was formed for there to be "joint owner" consequences. 74
In Blackburn, appellant Blackburn appealed the trial court's grant of a
no evidence summary judgment motion in favor of Columbia Medical
Center of Arlington Subsidiary, L.P. ("Columbia"). Blackburn was in-
jured in an auto accident and sought treatment at Columbia's medical
facility.75 Blackburn claimed that Dr. Phyllis Noss, the radiologist who
Blackburn claimed was negligent in reviewing her X-rays, was a partner,
principal or employee of Medical Imaging of Dallas ("Medical Imag-
ing"). 76 Blackburn sued Columbia on the theory that Dr. Noss' wrongful
conduct was imputed to Medical Imaging and that Medical Imaging's lia-
bility was in turn imputed to Columbia, on the theory of joint enterprise
liability. 77 The essential elements of joint enterprise liability include:
(1) an agreement, express or implied, among members of the group;
(2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a commu-
nity of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and
(4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which
gives an equal right of control.78
Steven A. Waters & Eric Terry, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Issues for Partnerships,
L.L.C.'s and their Owners-The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly (July 18-19, 2002) (unpub-
lished paper on file with the SMU Law Review).
72. Woskob, 305 F.3d at 187.
73. Id. at 187-88.
74. The flow of the opinion itself was at times difficult to follow.
75. Blackburn v. Columbia Med. Ctr., 58 S.W.3d 263,266 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 2001,
pet denied).
76. Id. at 266-67 (indicating that Blackburn argued that Dr. Noss's negligence was im-
puted to Medical Imaging).
77. Id. at 267 (stating that Blackburn alleged that Dr. Noss was negligent in several
specific respects).
78. Id. at 271.
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On appeal, Columbia argued that Blackburn failed to show that there
was the requisite "community of pecuniary interest in that purpose be-
tween Columbia and Medical Imaging" or a right of control between
them concerning the conduct at issue. 79
There was no dispute about the existence of an agreement, express or
implied, between Columbia and Medical Imaging-there was a written
agreement that employees of Medical Imaging were independent contrac-
tors providing radiology services to patients at Columbia.80 Because Dr.
Noss was a principal and a partner at Medical Imaging, the first element
of joint enterprise liability (the existence of an agreement) was satisfied. 81
The written agreement also satisfied the second element of joint enter-
prise liability, serving as evidence of a "common purpose" to be carried
out by Columbia and Medical Imaging. 82
The court then considered whether there was a "community of pecuni-
ary interest" in that common purpose.83 Columbia offered a "no partner-
ship" defense-because there was no agreement to share profits or losses,
there was no community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose.
Sharing in profits and losses is an essential part of a partnership, and, as
the court stated, a "joint venture is governed by the same rules as a part-
nership .... -"84 But this court was not looking only at whether a partner-
ship or its cousin, a joint venture, existed. Citing Texas Department of
Transportation v. Able, the Blackburn court stated that a joint enterprise
is distinct from a joint venture, and sharing profits and losses is not neces-
sary to establish a joint enterprise.85
Because the joint enterprise notion is not seen very often, perhaps a bit
more extended discussion is warranted. In Able, the supreme court found
that the purpose of the parties' relationship included sharing resources to
further an ultimate purpose and realizing economic benefits from the re-
lationship.86 An express agreement to share profits and losses is not re-
quired-the fact that the relationship produced substantial monetary and
79. Id. at 269.
80. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
81. Id. (stating that the summary judgment record showed that Dr. Noss was a princi-
pal and a partner at Medical Imaging).
82. Id. at 271-72 (stating that the summary judgment record showed that there was
sufficient evidence to show a common purpose to be carried out by the group).
83. Id. at 272 (citing Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tex. 1974)
for the rule that the element of common purpose is limited to "those endeavors in which
the parties share a 'community of pecuniary interest' involving a business or pecuniary
purpose.").
84. Id. at 272-73. That is mostly true, but Texas case law has grafted an additional
condition in finding a joint venture, that the parties have agreed to share losses (and not
just profits). See Swineheart, 48 S.W.3d at 879; Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616
S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981).
85. Blackburn, 58 S.W.3d at 273 (citing Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 981 S.W.2d 765,
769 (Tex. App.-Houston 1998), affd, 35 S.W.3d 608 (Tex. 2000)) (emphasis added).
86. Able, 35 S.W.3d at 614 (stating that the master agreement "plainly recognized that
the project contemplated a joint effort that utilized federal, state and local funds; shared
resources in furtherance of the ultimate purpose of providing mass transit; and realized an
economic gain on the investment.").
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personnel savings indicated that it was more than one of mere conve-
nience.87 Therefore, a showing that profits and losses were shared was
not necessary to find that a community pecuniary interest existed; rather,
realizing an economic gain while furthering a common purpose were the
key elements.8 8 The Blackburn court noted that substantial monetary
and personnel savings shared by the parties in Able amounted to that key
economic benefit.89
The court in Blackburn found that, while the parties enjoyed benefits
from the relationship, the benefits were of a general nature and did not
amount to an economic gain sufficient to prove a community of pecuniary
interest. Testimony at trial indicated that the arrangement provided a
convenience for Columbia and its patients-the patients were not forced
to go elsewhere to obtain radiological services. In addition, the agree-
ment benefited Medical Imaging to the extent that Columbia maintained
the facilities and equipment necessary to operate the radiology services-
Medical Imaging did not have to buy and maintain its own equipment,
services and facilities.90
To illustrate the difference between the general benefits enjoyed by
Columbia and Medical Imaging and the type of economic benefits giving
rise to a joint enterprise, the court contrasted the facts of this case with
those in St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff.91 In St. Joseph Hospital, the rela-
tionship between the hospital and the Central Texas Medical Foundation
(a local medical-residency training program) reduced costs and duplica-
tions and produced shared financial benefits and costs. 92 The court stated
that the "reduction in costs and contemplation of economic gain by ap-
proaching the project as a joint undertaking" were the types of economic
benefits contemplated by the court in Able.93 By contrast, the Blackburn
court noted that there was no evidence of a similar pecuniary or mone-
tary interest in the relationship between Columbia and Medical Imaging
and that the general benefits derived from the relationship did not give
rise to a joint enterprise. 94
87. Blackburn, 58 S.W.3d at 274 (stating that "the court [in Able] found it noteworthy
that monetary and personnel savings produced from pooling of resources might have been
substantial and that the project was not a matter of mere friendly or family cooperation
and accommodation.").
88. Id. (stating that the common purpose furthered by the relationship may be the
sharing of profits and losses) (emphasis added).
89. Id.; Able, 35 S.W.3d at 614. These distinctions can be pretty fine, not obvious on a
first reading.
90. Blackburn, 58 S.W.3d at 275-76.
91. Id. at 276 (referring to St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002)).
92. Id. at 276 (stating that in St. Joseph Hosp. "the hospital paid residents an annual
stipend and the foundation paid a housing allowance, billed patients while remitting a por-
tion of the proceeds to the hospital for the residents' services").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 276-77. It certainly is the case that both Columbia and Medical Imaging
economically benefited from their arrangement, but apparently the connection was found
to be more incidental than in other situations where a joint enterprise was found.
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Columbia chose not to emphasize that the benefits of the relationship
between it and Medical Imaging did not amount to the economic benefits
contemplated by the court in Able.95 Instead, Columbia relied on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in Walker v. Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm, arguing that sharing profits and losses was, in fact, a necessary
element of a community of pecuniary interest.96 In Walker, the court
ruled that the independent contractor relationship between the parties
"generally precluded the imposition of joint enterprise liability."'97 Co-
lumbia followed the Walker court's assertion that joint enterprise was
born out of the realm of partnership law, and a significant distinction be-
tween a partnership and an independent contractor relationship is that a
partnership, and, by analogy, a joint enterprise, requires the sharing of
profits and losses. Here, Columbia did not share profits and losses with
Medical Imaging. 98 But the Blackburn court limited its application of
Walker to the proposition that the independent contractor relationship
precluded the imposition of joint enterprise liability, again rejecting Co-
lumbia's fundamental argument that sharing profits and losses was a nec-
essary prerequisite to joint enterprise liability.99 Fortunately for
Columbia, success required only that it prevail on the independent con-
tractor issue and not on an absence of profit and loss sharing.100
The agreement between Columbia and Medical Imaging expressly pro-
vided for an independent contractor relationship, but the court appropri-
ately looked beyond the label chosen by the parties and examined the
characteristics of the relationship to determine whether Medical Imaging
(and its employees, partners, etc.) was (1) an independent contractor, or
(2) part of a joint enterprise with Columbia.' 10 The agreement provided
that Medical Imaging and Columbia each had exclusive responsibility for
its respective employees and that the employees of Medical Imaging
could not incur any obligation on behalf of Columbia without express
written consent.'02 Medical Imaging was "responsible for establishing its
own schedule of fees and services and its sole source of compensation
[was] its own collection of fees from its patients."'1 03 The court ultimately
95. Perhaps it found the distinctions too fine, as well.
96. Id. at 274 (citing Walker v. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmBH, 844 F.2d 237,
242 (5th Cir. 1988)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 274 (stating that "the Walker court did not address sharing of profits and
losses in the context of supplying the community of pecuniary interest element for pur-
poses of establishing joint enterprise liability.").
100. So, although the court did not agree with Columbia's particular application of
Walker, it still found, on another theory enunciated in Walker, that there was not a joint
enterprise. Id. at 271. A win is a win is a win.
101. The court was specifically looking to find a community pecuniary interest.
102. See id. at 275 (noting that Medical imaging was exclusively responsible for "pay-
ment of its respective income tax, vacation pay, sick leave, unemployment insurance,
worker's compensation, retirement benefits, disability benefits, and any other employee
benefits").
103. Id. (stating that each party was "responsible for their own finances and that one
party could not be held responsible for any financial failure of the other party").
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confirmed the independent contractor nature of the relationship and, in a
meandering, back and forth manner, appeared to reconcile the holdings
in Able and Walker-the very nature of an independent contractor rela-
tionship is contrary to there being the necessary community of pecuniary
interest in the common purpose to find a joint enterprise.10 4 Conse-
quently, although Columbia's primary theory-that joint enterprise re-
quires the sharing of profits and losses-was not successful, Columbia
ultimately prevailed because characteristics that tended to disprove the
existence of a community of pecuniary interest also supported an inde-
pendent contractor relationship between the parties.1°5 The court af-
firmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Columbia. 106
III. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CASE
Workers' Compensation-Can the members of a limited liability com-
pany be considered employers for purposes of applying the Texas
Workers' Compensation Act?-Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C.
McQueeney Gypsum Company ("McQueeney") and Temple-Inland
Forest Products Corporation ("Temple") formed a limited liability com-
pany, Standard Gypsum, LLC ("Standard"). Under the terms of a sepa-
rate management agreement, Temple agreed to "manage and operate"
Standard's gypsum plant in McQueeney, Texas. Ingalls, an employee at
the Standard plant, was injured in a work-related accident. He recovered
workers' compensation benefits and then sued McQueeney and Temple,
as members of Standard, claiming that his injury could be attributed to
their negligence.10 7 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
McQueeney and Temple under the "exclusive remedy" theory of the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act.10 8 On appeal, the court considered
104. Id. This may be an area where court's "feel" for the essence of the parties' rela-
tionship determines the outcome. Were their efforts in such concert and their respective
economic stakes so tied together that there was a "joint enterprise," or were the parties
just cooperating in a way that satisfied their individual goals, a byproduct of which was a
potential for economic success, even if somewhat tied to the same events? Certainly, the
line seems not to be a bright one.
105. Id. at 276. On this issue, the court was definitive: "Here, there was absolutely no
evidence regarding either party's pecuniary or monetary interest in the agreement, much
less a community of pecuniary interest. In fact, the summary judgment evidence provided
conclusively disproves any community of pecuniary interest, as it supports an independent
contractor relationship." Id. (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 278.
107. Ingalls v. Standard Gypsum, L.L.C., 70 S.W.3d 252, 254 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2001, pet. denied)
108. Id. at 255 (quoting the Texas Workers Compensation Act, the court noted that
"[r~ecovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee cov-
ered by workers' compensation insurance coverage or a legal beneficiary against the em-
ployer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a work-related injury
sustained by the employee"). Employers who pay premiums and are part of the workers'




two separate theories under which McQueeney and Temple could be lia-
ble as third parties.
First, the court considered whether Temple (a member of Standard)
qualified as an employer for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision
of the Texas Workers' Compensation. Temple argued that, under the
management agreement, Temple had "the right to control the details of
Ingalls' work."' 0 9 Ingalls countered with evidence that Standard alone
controlled the details of his work. The court ruled that, under the man-
agement agreement, Temple in fact controlled Standard's employees. 110
That control was complete enough, as the court noted, to render Temple
liable for acts of Standard employees under the theory of respondeat su-
perior."' The court held that, based on the exclusionary theory of the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act, Ingalls served both Temple and Stan-
dard as an employee and that the nature of this dual-employment rela-
tionship precluded Ingalls' claim against Temple. 1 2
Second, regarding McQueeney's liability, the court considered whether
the members of a limited liability company should be considered employ-
ers for purposes of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. The court
began by stating that the Texas Legislature has adopted the entity theory
of partnership law, meaning that a "partnership is an entity in itself rather
than an aggregate of its members," and that "the employee of a partner-
ship is not an employee of an individual partner and can recover against
such partner, as a third party, for negligent injury incident to employ-
ment."" 3 The court turned to Sims v. Western Waste Industries to illus-
trate how courts have resolved the issue of liability of a parent
corporation for the acts of subsidiaries." 14 In Sims, the plaintiff sued the
parent corporation of his employer, on a theory of products liability, for
negligent design and manufacture of the garbage truck that injured
him.115 The court in Sims ruled that parent corporations should not be
allowed to "reverse-pierce" the corporate veil to avail themselves of the
protection of the exclusionary rule contained in the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Act. In other words, "the parent corporation could not argue
that it was not liable for the actions of its subsidiary and then argue that it
was the same entity for purposes of workers' compensation."' "16
109. Id. (noting in Ely v. Gen. Motors Corp., 927 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1996, writ denied), that a "person may be the servant of two employers at one time as
to one act if the service to one does not involve an abandonment of the other.").
110. Id. at 258.
111. Id. If you have the control necessary to be liable for employee actions, then you
also have the benefit of the workers' compensation scheme to protect you against their
efforts to assert separate claims.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 259 (internal citations omitted in original).
114. Id. at 259-60 (citing Sims v. W. Waste Indus., 918 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont, 1996, writ denied).
115. Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 683.
116. Ingalls, 70 S.W.3d at 260 (citing Sims, 918 S.W.2d at 686)..
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The Ingalls court applied the reasoning of the Sims court to the poten-
tial liability of members of a limited liability company. The court, how-
ever, distinguished Ingalls' claim from the claim in Sims, noting that the
plaintiff's claim in Sims was based on a theory of products liability, an
independent tort that is separate from the parties' relationship as em-
ployer and employee.' 17 The court ruled that, absent an independent tort
on the part of the members of a limited liability company, those members
should not be sued solely on the basis of their ownership of interests in
the limited liability company. 118 The court of appeals reversed the por-
tion of the case dealing with McQueeney's liability as a member of Stan-
dard and remanded the case for a determination of whether McQueeney
had committed an individual tort in connection with Ingalls' injury. 19
117. Id. at 261.
118. Id. For the court to have held otherwise, it would have ignored the strong, inten-
tional liability shield that protects members of a limited liability company, as shareholders
of a corporation are protected.
119. Id.
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